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I.

Background
Over the last thirty years, defined contribution (DC) pension plans have become the norm in the private sector in the U.S, as employers have used them to replace more traditional defined benefit (DB) plans. Unlike DB plans, workers offered a DC plan are not required to participate. Because participation often requires a contribution out of one's salary and into a tax-deferred savings account, many individuals choose not to take-part in the plan, even when eligible. The decision not to participate in an available DC plan is especially common amongst low-income individuals, who are also less likely to be offered a plan in the first place.
1 This "double-whammy" of high rates of voluntary non-participation and low rates of DC availability amongst low-income workers has become a serious concern of policy makers, especially as demographic shifts and impending reforms will likely result in Social Security replacing a smaller share of preretirement earnings in the future.
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While analysts debate the degree of retirement preparedness, most agree that within the bottom of the income distribution there is a significant share of individuals at risk of not being able to maintain their standard of living in retirement. 3 One suggested approach for improving the retirement security of this group, which has recently gained momentum, focuses on shrinking or eliminating the gap in pension coverage and/or sponsorship between low-income workers and others. Simply put, the policy would require firms that currently do not offer retirement plans to set up individual retirement accounts (IRAs) or a form of taxdeferred retirement savings vehicles for their employees. 4 Yet, given the voluntary nature of participation in these tax-deferred, DCtype saving vehicles, it is unclear how effective such a policy would be, since low-income workers could always decline to participate. Advocates of the policy note that even among low-income workers, the majority of individuals offered a DC pension plan participate. Thus, it would follow that if more low-income workers had access to a plan, most would participate. Of course, care must be taken in rendering this interpretation. As is always the case when looking at a group that has self-selected into an outcome (e.g., college entry, program participation, etc.) one must be concerned that the group that has selected in, in this case workers offered a DC pension, differ in unobservable ways from those who did not. Thus, in this paper we control for selection into the pensioned job. In doing so, we seek to answer the fundamental question of interest to policy makers: how likely are workers, and in particular low-income workers, to participate in a DC pension plan that they did not have access to prior to the policy? To our knowledge, this is not a question that has been addressed in the literature to date.
DC plans have been present and gaining popularity for more than thirty years now, which in turn has stimulated a growing literature that examines the determinants of individuals' participation and saving decisions in these plans.
Studies have used varied sources of data -household survey data, administrative earnings and contribution data, employee records in specific firms, as well as This paper addresses this deficiency by estimating a participation model that controls for selection into a plan, allowing accurate out-of-sample (i.e., to individuals without a pension) predictions on the effect of expanding pension coverage. We find that individuals currently without a DC pension are less likely than those with a pension to participate in an offered DC plan, even when controlling for observable characteristics. Thus, while the expansion of DC plans to workers not currently covered by such plans will improve pension coverage, the effect may not be as large as expected based on currently observed pension participation rates.
II. Data and Trends in Pension Coverage and Participation
Pension participation is the result of two events: 1) access to a retirement plan through an employer, and 2) the individual's enrollment in the plan. Using data from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS), figures 1 through 3 document trends in pension access and participation, drawing comparisons among income groups. Figure 1 shows the share of individuals working for an employer that sponsors a plan over the last three decades. Plan sponsorship clearly differs by earnings group. Less than one third of individuals in the bottom third of earnings, work for an employer that sponsors a plan, compared with close to 70 percent for the highest earnings group. 5 Except for the last decade and despite the shift from DB to DC plans, pension sponsorship has remained relatively stable and it has been evolving similarly for the three earnings groups.
In contrast, the participation rates for workers whose employers provide a plan have shown considerable divergence among earnings groups over time (see figure 2 ). While workers in the top third have had a nearly constant participation rate over the past 30 years, the rate for the middle third declined considerablyfrom 95 to 86 percent -and for the lowest third fell sharply -from 85 to 65 percent. Although the CPS does not ask about the type of pension plan an individual has, these declines in participation have occurred as pensions have shifted from mandatory (DB) to voluntary (DC) plans.
The data on pension access (figure 1) and participation (figure 2) together determine the overall participation rate, as shown in figure 3 . The biggest drops in overall participation occurred among middle and low earners, where the rate fell by 28 and 45 percent (or 20 and 17 percentage points), respectively. These declines drive policy makers' interest in expanding pension coverage. Yet, decreasing participation rates among low earners at sponsoring employers seems to be the bigger driver of the group's overall decline in participation rather than any dramatic change in its access to pensions. Still, the fact that low-income workers participate in offered plans a majority of the time leaves policy makers hopeful that an expansion of pension coverage would result in a large increase in pension participation. 6 We did not use the earlier 1996 panel, which also had the topical pension coverage module, because it was missing an important variable --the "availability of employer match". In the 1996 panel, the question was not asked to non-participants in the DC plan. The later panels 2004 and 2008 were not appropriate because the data collected is from a period when the automatic enrollment feature increased in popularity and has been shown to have strong effects on participation. However, the SIPP data does not collect information on automatic enrollment and we are not able to control for its effect. The last section of the paper elaborates on this issue.
The SIPP asks individuals if their employer sponsors a pension plan and if they participate in it. For workers who participated in their plan, individuals who claimed their benefit was based on earnings or years on the job are classified as having been offered a defined benefit plan, as their main plan, while workers who claimed they had an individual account plan are classified as being offered a defined contribution plan. Besides asking about their main plan, the SIPP includes an additional question about the availability and participation in a tax-deferred plan, similar to a 401(k), the answers to which we also take into account in determining the overall pension availability at the job.
Aside from pension plans, the core data of the SIPP provides information on individual and employer characteristics that are likely to be associated with pension offers and participation. This information includes an individual's age, race, education, marital status, whether he has children, tenure at the firm, and state of residence. The data also include individuals' income from work and net worth. On the employer side, the size of the worker's employer, and the industry of employment were also obtained from the SIPP. Tables 1 through 5 present descriptive statistics of the workers in our sample. These descriptive statistics suggest workers sort into pensioned jobs, in observable ways for certain and perhaps in ways that are unobservable. Overall 64.1 percent of the workers in our sample work for an employer who sponsors a pension plan: 43.6 percent are at a firm that has a DC plan, and 25.5
are at a firm with a DB plan. 7 Overall pension coverage increases by income terciles -43.4 percent for the bottom income group compared with 81.4 percent for the top one. In addition, both DC and DB coverage increase with income: 28.6 percent of those in the bottom income tercile have access to a DC plan and 16.4
7 These are not exclusive categories, as some employers sponsor both types of pensions.
have DB coverage, compared with those at the top where 54.8 percent have DC coverage and 34.5 percent have a DB plan. Table 2 shows differences in observable characteristics of those who are currently at firms that sponsor pensions compared to those who are not. The descriptive statistics show that workers at pensioned jobs are significantly less likely to be female, more likely to be married, are older and have longer tenure at the job. Those at pensioned jobs are also much more likely to have a college degree. These observable differences suggest workers may sort into pensioned jobs, but are also consistent with the notion that "better" jobs that hire more experienced or educated workers are also more likely to offer pensions. If these observable differences were the only source of the selection, we would expect the differences to dissipate once we control for income. Table 3 compares the characteristics of workers at firms with DC plans and those without DC plans, while also controlling for income. We continue to observe significant differences. Even within each income tercile, workers at jobs with DC plans are more likely to be married, less likely to not have a high school degree, significantly more likely to have a college degree, and have higher median income and earnings than those without DC plans. These results suggest that pension coverage is not random in the population, and that there might be some unobservable factors in addition to observable factors that are behind the sorting mechanism of workers into firms with different pension coverage.
As mentioned earlier, pension participation is the result of pension sponsorship, eligibility and the decision to participate. Since the goal of the empirical specification in the next section is to uncover the determinants of voluntary participation, the focus is on individuals who are both in jobs with employer plans and are eligible to participate. As table 4 shows, 43.6 percent of workers in our sample are with an employer that sponsors a DC-type plan, however only 36.7 percent are eligible to participate. Both eligibility and voluntary participation correlate highly with income. Eligibility is particularly low among low-income workers -18.3 percent of those in the bottom income tercile are eligible to take part in a DC plan, compared with 50.8 percent of those at the top third of the income distribution. Among workers who are eligible, 76.5 percent chose to participate -59.2 percent for those in the lowest income tercile, compared with 84.9 percent for those in the highest. either an "Auto-IRA" or a DC-type plan should expect lower participation than might be indicated when examining the current covered population. 9 The next two sections describe our empirical strategy and results of estimating the determinants of pension plan coverage and voluntary participation.
III. Empirical Strategy
In our empirical approach, we start with a standard probit specification to model the decision to participate in an offered 401(k) plan, estimated on the sample of individuals who are working for an employer sponsoring a 401(k) plan and are eligible to participate (see equation 1). This provides us with results easily comparable to those in previous literature.
A. Probit:
(1)
where * is latent propensity to participate and x = {demographics, tenure at current job, annual income, wealth, etc.}
In the specifications that follow we allow the unobservable that affects the probability of being offered a 401(k) plan to be correlated with the unobservable that affects the worker's decision to choose participation. The empirical setup that achieves this in the probit specification is a bivariate probit model with sample selection as described in Green (2008) . This formulation was first presented by Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) and applied to our question of interest has the following basic set up, which builds on equation (1).
B. Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection:
1 * = x 1´β1 + ε 1 where ε 1 ∼ (0, 
Alternatively we can write the model in the following way where equation
(5) models the probability of being offered a DC plan, and equation (6) models the likelihood of participating if offered. Since the correlation coefficient ρ denotes the extent to which the two errors covary, when ρ ≠ 0, standard probit techniques applied to equation (6) yield biased results. To achieve a consistent and asymptotically efficient estimate of β 2 we need to account for the sample selection and estimate the two equations jointly. The parameter vector =
( 1 , 2 , ) can be recovered via by maximum likelihood.
C.
Identification
Although most selection type models are technically identified simply through functional form, it has become an established practice in the literature to include at least one exclusion regressor in the selection equation as a way to improve identification and lead to more stable and reliable estimates. This exclusionary regressor should affect the probability an individual is offered a DC pension (selected) without influencing pension participation (the outcome). 10 For this purpose, we have chosen several variables that vary by state of residence and reflect the availability of DC plans. These variables are the ratio of defined contribution plans to all pension plans, the proportion of firms with more than 100 workers, and the proportion of firms with 25 to 99 workers in a worker's state of residence. Our assumption is that these variables capture variation in the availability of 401(k) plans coming from the employer side and are exogenous factors in the workers' saving decisions.
Although it is impossible to test the validity of the exclusion restrictions, simple OLS regressions results suggest that these variables are strongly correlated with the probability a person is offered a defined contribution plan and are not significant determinants of the decision to participate. For these to be valid exclusion restrictions, the underlying assumption is that people do not move to a state because they are more likely to participate in a defined contribution plan once offered. This would be the case if, for example, individuals moved to a state because the culture was one of thrift and they identified with that culture, or if state-wide preferences towards savings and tax-deferred forms of compensation are simultaneously leading to more firms offering plans and more workers choosing to participate. This is indeed a possibility, which would severely jeopardize the validity of our instruments, and which unfortunately we are not Table 6a compares estimates from a standard probit model with one which in addition controls for selection. Specifications 2) through 5) differ based on the availability of additional controls and exclusion restrictions. Interestingly, having a DB plan is positively correlated with participation in a DC plan in the probit specification, but its coefficient turns negative and its significance disappears in the specifications with selection. Having a DB plan, however is strongly negatively associated with being offered a DC plan in the first place, likely driven by the fact that employers who already sponsor a DB plan are less likely also sponsor a DC plan. The positive coefficient of having a DB plan in the probit specification could be the result of self-selection of more saving-prone individuals into jobs with pension plans.
IV. Results
A. Determinants of Participation
The estimated correlation coefficient is positive and strongly significant in specifications 2) through 5) and so are the coefficients on the exclusion restrictions. These results support the hypothesis of a possible self-selection effect and suggest that indeed individuals in defined contribution jobs are more likely to participate than similar individuals in jobs not offering these pension plans, based on factors unobservable to the estimation. Table 6a 
B. Pension Participation Gap with Universal Coverage
Tables 7a and 7b illustrate this point by comparing predicted participation rates by income groups using the results from tables 6a. Given the dichotomy of the employer match provision, instead of assuming a match structure that will be available to currently uncovered individuals, we present two scenarios. Table 7a assumes that all defined contribution plans offer a match at the same rate as the average firm in our sample, while table 7b assumes that none of the existing or future defined contribution plans provide a match. Both tables show a considerable participation gap that remains between low and high income individuals. To the extent that universal coverage is achieved through the expansion of similarly in nature to the existing tax-deferred voluntary participation plans, policy makers should expect a remaining participation gap between low and high earners ranging between 24 and 35 percent, and a lower on average coverage rate than the one observed in current pension-sponsoring jobs.
The benefit of controlling for the unobserved characteristics of individuals that select into pensioned jobs can be seen by examining Table 7a Previous literature has documented that firms that switched from opt-in to opt-out regimes experienced significant increase in their employees' participation rates, sometimes even in the absence of an employer match (Beshears et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2004; Madrian and Shea 2001) .
Unfortunately data limitations do not allow us to control for the effect of this provision. To the extent that the effect of automatic enrollment on participation might differ based on workers' observed and unobserved characteristics, the results presented above should be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, the current estimates of the effect of the automatic enrollment provision are all based on firm-level studies that follow workers' actions for a relatively short period of time and are not yet able to capture the long-term population-wide effects on participation. To the extent that low-income workers are more likely to opt-out (e.g. due to liquidity constraints), and as a result are less influenced by these provisions, the estimates of the remaining participation gap (tables 7a and 7b) will likely not be too far off from the true population effects event if automatic enrollment becomes the norm in the future. Moreover, recent papers point to the possibility of employers responding to the increased costs of automatic enrollment by setting relatively low default contribution rates or lowering the employer match or employer contribution rates in their plans, which in turn might decrease workers' benefit of participating (Butrica and Karamcheva 2012; Soto and Butrica 2009) . The extent to which the effects of instituting automatic enrollment on one hand, and employers' cost-reducing actions on the other hand, might have offsetting effects on participation, is an interesting avenue for future research.
V. Conclusion
Over the last three decades, pension participation in the U.S. amongst lowincome individuals has dropped in half to just above 20 percent. Policy makers and researchers have sought to remedy this decline, and given that private pension plans currently cover only half of the workforce, some of the suggested proposals have called for extending the availability of tax-deferred private saving vehicles, similar to 401(k)s or IRAs to all workers, thus achieving almost universal coverage. Given the voluntary nature of participation in these plans, however, having access to a plan, often does not translate into actually participating and contributing to the plan. Understanding what determines participation is vital in assessing the potential effects of policy proposals.
Using data on workers currently at employers who sponsor plans, previous literature has consistently identified certain factors such as age, education, marital status, tenure, income, wealth, and the availability of an employer match, as important determinants of participation. Using data from the 2001 panel of the SIPP, this paper confirms those findings, but also builds on previous results by controlling for an important but often omitted factor that affects individuals' choice of participation. Observations of significant differences in characteristics between workers at pension jobs and those without, as well as between participants and non-participants hint at potential unobservable factors that might be behind the self-selection of workers with higher propensity to save into jobs that offer tax-deferred savings plans. The implication of this selection is that individuals who are currently at jobs with no pension plans may be especially unlikely to contribute, when given the option. Our estimates suggest that this selection effect is non-trivial. Whereas, extending tax deferred plan coverage will likely lead to increased participation on average, our findings point to a remaining participation gap between low-and high-income workers between 24 and 35 percentage points, which might be higher than what policy makers hope for and expect based on the participation patterns of workers currently offered these kinds of pensions. Notes: Significance levels refer to conducted tests for difference in means or medians between the "no pension plan" category and the DC and DB categories respectively. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. Marginal effects calculated at means using discrete changes for the dummy variables. Standard errors in brackets. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
